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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CIRCUIT COURT DETERMINES
A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRST AND FIFTH
AMENDMENTS IN CONTEXT OF ORGANIZATIONAL
DISCLOSURE
Negating the Communist Party's statutory obligation to 'disclose
information inculpatory to its members on the basis of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit adopted a theory of fifth
amendment applicability for first amendment groups. An exam-
ination of fifth amendment policies supporting this result provides
a rationale for granting protection against compelled self-incrim-
ination to all individuals in organizational roles.
W HILE the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
has long prohibited the compelled production or inspection of an
individual's private incriminatory papers,- a concomitant line of
authority has exorcised organizational records from the protective
ambit of that privilege.2  Considering such collectivized informa-
1 See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 809-18 (1921); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630-35 (1886); Takahashi v. United States, 143 F.2d 118, 123-25 (9th
Cir. 1944); United States v. W ng Quong Wong, 94 F. 882 (D. Vt. 1899); J. MAGuniE,
EvmaNcE OF GUILT § 2.04, at 22-24 (1959) [hereinafter cited as MAGuIRE]; 8 J. WIoMoRE,
EvmENcE §§ 2200, 2264 (McNaughten rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WVIGMoRE];
Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 Micir.
L. Rav. 1, 15-19 (1930); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L.
Ray. 1, 34-38 (1949); Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the Reason, 54 GEo.
L.J. 593, 596-600, 622-28 (1966); cf. United States v. Stern, 225 F. Supp. 187, 189-95
(S.D.N.Y. 1964). But see Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 234-41 (1960); United
States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92, 95-96 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 869 U.S. 844 (1962); United
States v. Fulcher, 229 F. Supp. 456, 458 (D. Md. 1964); cf. Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 867, 371-72 (1951).
It seems likely that the overruling of the mere evidence rule in Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 800-10 (1967), will render private papers subject to inspection under the
fourth amendment, although an individual himself may still not be compelled to
produce them in court because of the fifth amendment. Compare Warden v. Hayden,
supra, with Schmerber v. California, 884 U.S. 757, 760-64 (1966), and Note, Supreme
Court Delineates the Relationship Between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 1967
Dunt L.J. 866, 384 & n.106. But see Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the
Reason, 54 GEo. L.J. 593, 623-25 (1966).
2See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 867, 371-72 (1951); United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 888 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186, 205-10 (1946); United States v. White, 822 U.S. 694, 697-705 (1944); United
States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 726-28 (1944); Essgee Co. of China
v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 155-58 (1928); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 381-
86 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 48, 69-77 (1906); United States v. Onassis, 133 F.
Supp. 327, 381-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); cf. Shapiro v. United States, 385 U.S. 1 (1948);
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946). But see United States v. Silverstein, 314
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tion to be impersonal in character, the courts have held that neither
an organization nor its officers may invoke the privilege to prevent
the production of records leading to the criminal prosecution of
either.3 Further, an individual operating within the organizational
framework may be required both to record and produce self-incrim-
inatory information of specified associational activities without re-
course to the fifth amendment.4 Because disclosure has been con-
sidered necessary to organizational regulation,5 ensuing personal
incrimination has been regarded as a justifiable consequence. 6
F.2d 789 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963); United States v. Cogan, 257 F.
Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); cf. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D.
Cal. 1948). See also New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
'See cases cited note 2 supra; notes 5, 6 infra and accompanying text. See gen-
erailly 8 WIGMORE §§ 2259a-d; Corwin, supra note 1, at 16-19.
'Under the so-called "required records" doctrine promulgated by Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), the Government may require the production of
information generally attendant to subjects of appropriate governmental regulation.
Cf. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927); FTC v. National Biscuit Co., 18 F.
Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); notes 47-49 infra. However, the Government may also
demand reports for the additional purpose of securing evidence of criminal viola-
tions of regulatory laws. See Shapiro v. United States, supra at 15; note 49 infra
and accompanying text. See generally Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Government's Need for Information,
1966 Sup. CT. RIv. 103; Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act, and the Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 687 (1951); Note, 65 CoLum. L.
Rlv. 681 (1965); Note, The Constitutional Rights of Associations to Assert the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 112 U. PA. L. Rlv. 394 (1964). However, the Court's recent
extension of fifth amendment scope to include products of testimonial compulsion may
foreclose the compelled personal disclosure of incriminatory information in associa-
tional records. Compare Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966), with
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967).
'See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-53 (1950); United
States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 724-28 (1944); ICC v. Baird, 194
U.S. 25, 44-47 (1904); cf. ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 473-75 (1894); 8 WiGMoRE § 2259c,
at 367; Meltzer, supra note 4, at 727-28.
' The self-incrimination of individual officers has been masked by various theories
of waiver, license, and property rights. The property theory states that since party A
has no privilege with respect to the incriminatory records belonging to party B, the
corporate officer cannot invoke the privilege with respect to the corporation's records.
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 70 (1906); Meltzer, supra note 4, at 705-08; Note, The Constitutional Rights of
Associations to Assert the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 112 U. PA. L. REv.
394, 396, 406-07 (1964). Under the so-called licensing theory, the individual has no
privilege because he has chosen to engage in an activity which is subject to govern-
mental approval or control and is therefore subject to regulation through informa-
tional reports. See Morgan, supra note 1, at 36-38; cf. Shapiro v. United States, 335
U.S. 1, 32, 35 (1948). The waiver theory promulgated in Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361, 380-85 (1911), assumes that by simply becoming responsible for corporate
records or activity, an officer thereby waives the privilege against self-incrimination
with respect to corporate information. See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
See generally 8 WimoMRE §§ 2259a-d; Meltzer, supra note 4, at 702-08, 713-15.
Vol. 1968: 134]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
circumscribed this line of authority by holding the privilege available
to associations which are repositories of their adherents' first amend-
ment rights-if disclosure of the records would result in criminal
prosecution of the membership.7
Communist Party of the United States v. United States (1967)8
eviscerates the Subversive Activity Control Board's (SACB) long-
standing order that the Communist Party register as a "communist
action" organization.0 That directive not only required the Party
so to register, but also commanded its officers to file an accompanying
statement containing the Party's membership lists.10 The Supreme
7Communist Party of the United States v. United States, 384 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir.
1967). The concurring opinion was based upon the concept that each member of the
Party had access to the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, group disclosure
which could be accomplished only through such members could not be compelled under
threat of punishment. Id. at 968-69 (concurring opinion). See notes 99-101 infra and
accompanying text.
8 384 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
9 The legislative order, from initial investigation to the decision in the instant case,
represents approximately 17 years of Board proceedings and court litigation. In 1950
the Attorney General petitioned the Board to order the Party's registration pursuant
to § 13 (a) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 792 (a) (1964).
The Party unsuccessfully sought a stay of proceedings on the ground that such hear-
ings would violate the first and fifth amendments. Communist Party of the United
States v. McGrath, 96 F. Supp. 47 (D.D.C.), stay pending appeal denied, 340 U.S. 950
(1951). After voluminous hearings, the Board determined that the Party was a "com-
munist action" organization and issued a registration order to that effect. The Party
appealed that determination, attacking the constitutionality of both the Act and the
Board's order as well as the evidentiary basis of the order. The District of Columbia
Circuit upheld the Board order denying appellant's motion to adduce new evidence.
Communist Party of the United States v. SACB, 223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954). How-
ever, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the Board for determinations
based upon untainted evidence. Communist Party of the United States v. SACB, 351
U.S. 115 (1956). The Board affirmed its original order and the Circuit Court reversed
on the basis that the Party had been improperly denied discovery of governmental
documents. Communist Party of the United States v. SACB, 254 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir.
1958). Upon second remand, the Board reconfirmed its determination that appellant
was a "communist action" group and issued yet another registration order. The
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed that directive. Communist Party of the United
States v. SACB, 277 F.2d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1959). On appeal, the Supreme Court sustained
the validity of the registraiton order but declined to reach the question of compelled
self-incrimination. Communist Party of the United States v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
When the Party refused to register, it was convicted of failure to comply with the
Board order. However, that judgment was overturned on the basis of the Party's
argument that it could not register without incriminating its members. Communist
Party of the United States v. United States, 381 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 968 (1964). At the second trial, the Party maintained its fifth amendment
stance, arguing that disclosure by any member to any person would result in self-
incrimination. The instant case is an appeal from the second conviction. Communist
Party of the United States v. United States, 384 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
10 Section 3 (3) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 782 (3) (a)
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Court upheld the disclosure requirements as a legitimate restriction
upon the first amendment privileges of anonymity and association"
on the basis of congressional findings that the Party had taken action
preparatory to violent overthrow of the Government.12 The Court
ruled that assertion of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination was not ripe for adjudication because no proceed-
ings had been instituted to punish the Party or its officers for failure
to comply with the challenged directive.' 3 However, in a decision
(1964), defined a "communist-action" group as "any organization . . . which (i) is sub-
stantially directed, dominated, or controlled by [the Soviet Union] ... and (ii) operates
primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist movement... Under
§ 13 (a) of that Act, 50 U.S.C. § 792 (a) (1964), the Attorney General was directed to
petition the Board for an order requiring the registration of any "communist-action"
organization which had not reported as such within thirty days after the Act became
effective. Following a Board determination of "communist-action" status, § 7 (a) of
the Act, id. § 786 (a), required the affected organization to register with the Attorney
General "on a form prescribed by him by regulations ...." Section 7 (d), id. § 786 (d),
required, inter alia, that the accompanying registration statement contain the name of
the organization and the address of its principal office; the names and addresses of its
present officers and of individuals who have been officers within the preceding twelve
months, with a designation of the office held by each and a brief statement of the
functions and duties of each; an accounting of all moneys received and expended by
the organization during the past twelve months; and the name and address of each
individual who was a member during the preceding twelve months.
I1 Communist Party of the United States v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
2 Id. at 88-105.
1 The Party had attempted to raise the privilege on behalf of its officers, arguing
that requiring their personal signatures pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §§ 11.200, 11.205 (Supp.
1960) would subject them to self-incrimination. The majority opinion evaded the issue
by contending that since the order was not yet final, "[w]e cannot know now that
the Party's officers will ever claim the privilege," or whether the Attorney General
would honor the privilege if claimed. 367 U.S. at 107. Four Justices dissented from
that position arguing that the disclosure provisions came into direct conflict with the
privilege against self-incrimination. Mr. Justice Black argued that the penalties visited
upon members under the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964), and the Subversive
Activities Control Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-98 (1964), were sufficient to raise the privilege
as a shield against the officers' self-incrimination through registration. 367 U.S. at 137-45
(Black, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Douglas, while agreeing with Mr. Justice Black that
the statute violated the fifth amendment because of its incriminatory effect upon indi-
vidual members, see id. at 175-84 (Douglas, J., dissenting), also raised a 'us tertii
argument based upon the "intimate connection between associations and their mem-
bers." Id. at 184-88. In his view, the Party could assert the privilege to avoid the
Act's inevitable effect of depriving members of their privilege against being "compelled
to reveal their connection with the Party." Id. at 187. Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by
the Chief Justice, dissented in part, contending that the Court should reach the particu-
lar issue of whether the registration requirements violated the fifth amendment
privilege of the officials charged with registering the Party. Id. at 192-93 (Brennan,
J., dissenting in part). Mr. Justice Brennan noted that forcing an individual to claim
the privilege in lieu of signing a registration statement, on the basis that he was an
officer to whom the order applied, was itself self-incrimination. Thus, the statute
unconstitutionally demanded an incriminatory response to an "indirect" inquiry.
Id. at 195-96; see Byse, Teachers and the Fifth Amendment, 102 U. PA. L. RE~v. 871,
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rendered the same day,14 the Court affirmed the criminal conviction
of a Communist Party adherent under the "membership" clause of
the Smith Act.15 Consequently, it became clear that disclosure of
Party membership lists might subject all members to criminal prose-
cution, particularly those officers signing the disclosure statement
itself.
Subsequent to these decisions, regulations were promulgated
which permitted the Party to register and disclose through any
willing "agent" or "other person" rather than through officers or
members.' 6 The Party, however, declined to authorize disclosure
by any agent and asserted the privilege against self-incrimination
on behalf of its officers and members.'1 Rejecting this claim, the
Government initiated successful proceedings against the organiza-
876 (1954); McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-incrimination, 51 J. CalM. L.C.
& P.S. 138, 152-53 & n.61 (1960); Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 24 U. CI. L. REv. 472, 490 (1957). In his opinion, the
registration requirement was particularly offensive because it forced the individual
Party member to come forward and claim the privilege although the Government had
not satisfied an initial burden of inquiry by naming the official as a probable source
of relevant evidence. 367 U.S. at 196 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part); cf. McNaughton,
supra, at 145-46 & n.37, 153-54. Further, Mr. Justice Brennan stated that he failed to
see the distinction between the oral testimony protected by Curcio v. United States, 354
U.S. 118 (1957), and the "written testimony" of signing the registration statement.
367 U.S. at 201 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). In his view, both were equally entitled
to fifth amendment protection.
" Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); cf. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S.
290 (1961).
'- 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1954). The provision states that: "Whoever organizes or helps or
attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate or
encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence;
or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly
of persons, knowing the purposes thereof-
Shall be fined . . . or imprisoned ... or both .... " (emphasis added).
16 The previous regulations, in force at the time of Communist Party of the United
States v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1 (1961), required the disclosure statement to be signed by the
"partners, officers, directors and members of the governing body." Form ISA-1, 28
C.F.R. § 11.200 (Supp. 1960). Perhaps because of the strong dissents by members of
the Court in 1961, the regulations were changed to allow registration by any willing
"agent or other person." Forms IS-51 (a) (registration) and IS-51 (disclosure), 28
C.F.R. §§ 11.200-.207 (1966); see Communist Party v. United States, 384 F.2d 957, 959 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 1967); note 10 supra.
1? The extent of the Party's compliance with the registration order was limited
to notfying the Justice Department, on official Party stationery, that its officers declined
to authorize disclosure of information other than the organization's name, address, and
telephone number because of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
384 F.2d at 967. This letter, signed by the "authorized officers" of the Party, also
challenged the Government's right to compel the Party to characterize itself as dom-
inated by the Soviet Union when the Party itself did not believe the organization to be
so controlled. Brief for Appellant at 15. See note 69 infra and accompanying text.
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tion for failure to register. This conviction was reversed and re-
manded by the District of Columbia Circuit18 which relied upon the
criminality connected with Party membership to conclude that:
(1) the self-incrimination privilege was available to the officers of
the Party, (2) that privilege had in fact been adequately asserted,
(3) to the extent registration could, under the regulations, be
effected by an "agent" or "other person," conviction must at least
rest upon proof of the availability of such person. 19
Seeking to meet this last requirement, and thus vitiate the
association's claim of privilege, the Government produced two
informer-members at the Party's second trial who testified that they
were willing to register appellant and disclose the necessary informa-
tion when, and if, it was made available by the Party.20 Conviction
and the instant appeal followed. In Communist Party of the United
States v. United States (1967)21 the District of Columbia Circuit
overruled the conviction of the Party for failure to comply with the
registration order. Since the criminal status of knowing Party
membership had previously been held constitutional, 22 the court
found the statutory scheme compelling the Party to disclose its
membership prohibited by the "privilege against incrimination." 23
18 Communist Party of the United States v. United States, 331 F.2d 807, 811-13 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 968 (1964). The court's rationale was that the
mere act of registering for the Party was self-incriminatory, a situation to be contrasted
to the potential incrimination resulting from the production of subpoened inculpatory
organizational records. Id. at 812-13. But see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-
37 (1886); note 74 infra; cf. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377-80 (1911).
10 Communist Party of the United States v. United States, 331 F.2d 807, 812-15 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 968 (1964); see Communist Party of the United States
v. United States, 384 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The statement that the Government
must prove the availability of a willing witness was predicated upon earlier cases which
allowed the disclosure of incriminatory material only through such a voluntary agent.
See 331 F.2d at 814-15; cf. United States v. 3963 Bottles, 265 F.2d 332, 336 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 931 (1959); United States v. 42 Jars, 162 F. Supp. 944 (D.N.J.
1958); Simon v. American Tobacco Co., 192 F. 662 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1942). See also
McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S.
349, 356-65 (1950); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-91 (1934).
20 384 F.2d at 967.
2- 384 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
22 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); see notes 14 & 15 supra and
accompanying text; cf. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
23 Apparently, the court deliberately dropped the "self" from the privilege against
self-incrimination, in support of its theory that organizations of individuals asserting
first amendment rights--"first amendment groups"-were themselves entitled to a privi-
lege against self-incrimination. See 384 F.2d at 958. This theory, however, fails on the
facts of the case. See notes 103-07 infra and accompanying text.
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THE "ORGANIZATION MAN" AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination has rendered it applicable
to individuals appearing either to testify or produce private papers
before grand juries, legislative, quasi-judicial, and administrative
bodies, and in police interrogations. 24 Nevertheless, while expand-
ing the scope of the fifth amendment for the "private" individual,
the Supreme Court has generally denied the privilege with respect
to organizations and has provided their officers with but limited
protection from incrimination 25 particularly within the context of
economic regulation.2 6
21 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (police interrogation); Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (bi-state regulatory and investigative commission);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (state court referee); Quinn v. United States, 349
U.S. 155 (1955) (congressional committee); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924)
(bankruptcy proceedings); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (grand jury).
The courts have further held that the privilege is properly invoked so long as tile
desired disclosure would provide a "link in the chain of evidence" leading to the
criminal conviction of the protesting party. See, e.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra
at 574-75.
2r See cases cited notes 2 & 4 supra. Commentators considering the problems of
incriminatory group disclosures have generally criticized the enabling legislative schemes
on the ground that the waiver, licensing, and property concepts fail to provide a
rational constitutional basis for the resultant incrimination. See MAGUIRE §§ 2.09 (2)- (3);
8 W GmORE §§ 2259b-c; Mansfield, supra note 4, at 116, 130-45; Meltzer, supra note 4,
at 702-03, 706-15; Note, 65 CoLoUr. L. REv. 681, 685-87 (1965); Note, 68 HARv. L. REV.
340, 341-45 (1954); Note, The Constitutional Rights of Associations to Assert the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 394, 400-03 (1964); cf. Rice,
The Constitutional Right of Association, 16 HAsTiNGs L.J. 491, 492, 503-08 (1965). But
see Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigation, 56 YALE LJ. 1111, 1127-29 (1947).
See also Fraser, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination As Applied to Custodians of
Organizational Records, 33 WAsI. L. REV. 435 (1958). However, many of the same
authorities have approved the "public interest" concept as a sufficient constitutional
ground for eliminating the privilege for individual members of an organization. See
MAGUIRE § 2.09, at 105; 8 WIGMORE § 2259c, at 367; Mansfield, supra note 4, at 119;
Meltzer, supra note 4, at 727-28; Note, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 681, 682-83, 695 (1965); Note,
68 HARv. L. Ry. 340, 344-46 (1954). But cf. Douglas, The Right of Association, 63
CoLTum. L. REv. 1361 (1963). Most have considered due process protections sufficiently
broad to prevent abuse of disclosure procedures. See note 82 infra.
26Despite the inapplicability of the fifth amendment to corporations and other
organizations, the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures has been extended to these groups. See, e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). However, broad congressional grants
of administrative power also have served effectively to dilute this privilege on the
theory that there is less reason to protect corporate privacy than that of the indi-
vidual. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-53 (1950); Hale
v. Henkel, supra at 82-83 (McKenna, J., concurring); cf. Shapiro v. United States, 335
U.S. 1, 29-33 (1948); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 588-93 (1946). See generally
Davis, supra note 25; Rogge, Inquisitions by Oficials: A Study of Due Process Require-
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In the first significant case considering the constitutional impli-
cations of compelled production of organizational records, Boyd v.
United Statesy the Supreme Court determined that the privilege
prohibited coerced self-incrimination in the form of response to a
subpoena duces tecum of "private" business papers.28 While the
Boyd rationale equated compelled production with coerced testi-
mony,29 the privilege apparently depended upon whether the records
were required to be kept by law, and were therefore open to public
inspection, rather than upon a categorization of "personal" versus
"business" records.30 The public inspection distinction, however,
ments in Administrative Investigations (pts. I-II), 47 MINN. L. REv. 939 (1963), 48
MINN. L. REv. 557, 1081 (1964); Note, Discovery in Federal Administrative Proceed-
ings, 16 STAN. L. Rxv. 1035 (1964).
Recently, in United States ex rel. DeForte v. Mancusi, 379 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967),
the Second Circuit ruled that an indicted officer had standing to challenge the ad-
mission of evidence resulting from an illegal search and seizure of his union's records
where the search was directed at him and was an invasion of his privacy. Id. at 903-05;
cf. See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Jones v. United States, 862 U.S. 257 (1960).
But cf. Meltzer, supra note 4, at 693-94. While the decision provides greater pro-
tection for the accused in an explicitly criminal case, it seems unlikely to carry
over as precedent in an administrative hearing conducted prior to prosecutorial activ-
ity. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 388 U.S. 632, 640-43 (1950); Meltzer, supra
note 4, at 701. But see Note, 68 HARv. L. REv. 340, 346-49 (1954). See generally
Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission
(pts. I & H), 28 CoLum. L. REv. 708, 905 (1928).
7 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
21 The Boyd Court's conception of "private" business papers seemed rather broad,
apparently encompassing all records except "books required by law to be kept for
.. . inspection." Id. at 623-24.
20Id. at 683-37. See also Meltzer, supra note 4, at 721-23. The Boyd decision
retains its validity with respect to the unconstitutionality of compelling the self-
production of an individual's "private papers" to the present day. See Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966) (dictum); note 1 supra.
30 116 U.S. at 622-23. The Boyd Court's determination that the privilege was
inapplicable only to "public" records required to be kept for public use comported
with English doctrine allowing organizations and business enterprises of a "private
nature" to retain the privilege against self-incrimination. See Rex v. Purnell, 96 Eng.
Rep. 20 (K.B. 1748); Rex v. Cornelius, 93 Eng. Rep. 1133 (K.B. 1744); Regina v. Mead,
92 Eng. Rep. 119 (K.B. 1703); Rex v. Worsenham, 91 Eng. Rep. 1370 (K.B. 1701). See
also Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 388-91 (1911) (McKenna, J., dissenting);
Meltzer, supra note 4, at 702. The English privilege seemingly continues to the
present day, where claimed by the company with respect to the demanded material.
Cf. Triplex Safety Glass Co. v. Lancegaye Safety Glass, Ltd., [1939] 2 K.B. 395.
A strong argument can be made that the American doctrine of the inviolability of
"private" papers has been severely limited by recent Supreme Court decisions. As
originally articulated in Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, (K.B. 1765), that con-
cept was set forth in terms of prohibiting general or warrantless searches. Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), transported Entick into the constitutional law of
this country. There the Court enunciated a dual concept of fourth amendment con-
structive search and self-incrimination under the fifth amendment to hold that an
individual could not be compelled to produce incriminatory "prviate" documents.
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was subsequently discarded through a shift in the pivotal emphasis
from the character of the records sought to the nature of the entity
retaining those records.31 Postulating that submission to "visitorial"
inspection of corporate records was an adjunct of governmental
consent to function in corporate form,32 the Court concluded that
the "personal" nature of the privilege rendered it available only to
"natural" individuals-not to organizations. 3 Although those broad
Id. at 626-35. Subsequently, Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), and Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), indicated that private papers were not inviolable
as a source of evidence in all cases under the fourth amendment. However, the
latter case promulgated the mere evidence rule-that a search for and seizure of
anything except contraband, instrumentalities, and fruits of a crime violated the fifth
as well as the fourth amendment. Id. at 308-11.
The rule seems to have been best honored in the breach, except where "private"
papers were concerned. Compare Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927), and
United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92, 94-95 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 844 (1962),
with United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464-66 (1932), Takahashi v. United
States, 143 F.2d 118, 123-25 (9th Cir. 1944), and United States v. Stern, 225 F. Supp. 187,
190-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See generally Comment, Eavesdropping Devices and the Fourth
Amendment, 66 CoLum. L. Rsv. 355, 359-70 (1966); Note, Supreme Court Delineates
the Relationship Between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 1967 DUKE L.J. 366,
378 & nn.78-81; Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the Reason, 54 GEo. L.J.
593 (1966).
The Supreme Court's invalidation of the mere evidence rule in Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967), indicated that Boyd is still authority for the proposition that an
individual may not be compelled to produce incriminatory personal papers in court.
Even that statement, however, seems too narrow because the fifth amendment would
prohibit compelling an accused to bring any incriminatory material into court.
Thus the only question remaining is whether this rule should extend to protecting
an individual from the compulsory production of organizational records. See notes
112-22 infra and accompanying text; cf. Note, The Constitutional Rights of Associa-
tions to Assert the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 394, 405-06
(1964).
31 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-76 (1906). Although early cases tended to rely
upon the visitorial inspection rationale for defeating a corporate or associational indi-
vidual's claim of privilege, the underlying theory that organizational records were
subject to inspection because of their "public" nature came to the fore in Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). That case explicated the "required records" doctrine,
holding that records required to be kept for regulatory purposes thereby became
"public" and open to inspection for the purpose of enforcing the relevant regulation.
Id. at 22-34; see Meltzer, supra note 4, at 708-15; Note, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 681, 685
(1965).
82 The commerce clause basis of federal informational schemes was early recognized
as a valid basis for inspection pursuant to the enforcement of federal regulations.
However, the scope of this federal power was deemed to be much narrower than the
general "visitorial" power of the states. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382-
84 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 72-76 (1906). But see Handler, The Constitu-
tionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission (pt. II), 28 COLUM. L.
Rrv. 905, 918-37 (1928). With the expansion of the scope of the commerce clause,
however, it became clear that, if anything, the federal investigatory power equaled
that of the states. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
82 201 U.S. at 74-75. Prior to the Hale case the privilege was generally considered
[Vol. 1968:134
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
holdings were predicated upon the existence of an immunity statute
protecting an officer producing the demanded records from criminal
prosecution,34 the Court eventually found compelled disclosure
proper even where such immunity was unavailable.3 5 This develop-
ment rested upon the previously subordinated ground that, as cus-
todian of the corporate records, the officer had "voluntarily assumed
a duty which overrides his claim of privilege."3 6
applicable to corporations. See W. StrnLAuD, NoS ON CoNsTrrursoN oF THE
UNITED STATES 627-28 (1904); 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2259 (1st ed. 1904); note 30
supra.
84 General Appropriation Act of February 25, 1903, ch. 755, § 1, 32 Stat. 854, 904,
cited in the Hale case, 201 U.S. at 66; see Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 390
(1911) (McKenna, J., dissenting); Ex Parte Chapman, 153 F. 371 (C.C.D. Idaho 1907).
The Chapman court distinguished the Hale case on the ground that the defendant
Chapman was utilizing his own privilege, not that of the corporation, in refusing to
produce incriminatory records. Id. at 375. Moreover, the court reasoned, there was
no immunity statute available to the Chapman defendant as there had been in Hale.
Id. at 375-77. For a recent discussion of federal immunity provisions currently in
force see Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice:
Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568 (1963).
88 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). The Wilson Court specifically re-
jected the English cases allowing corporations and their officers to invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination. Id. at 385-86. See note 30 supra.
Wilson, however, was based upon a very restricted set of circumstances which
scarcely warranted the broad rule that all officers could be compelled to incriminate
themselves through the production of corporate records. The directors of the corpo-
ration whose records were involved had passed a resolution ordering the president to
produce the subpoenaed information before the investigating grand jury. Moreover,
the grand jury sought the records solely for the purpose of incriminating the corporate
officer on a charge of fraudulent use of the mails. Id. at 367-71. It is arguable
that today due process considerations would prevent such a single-minded effort on
the part of the Government to secure books solely for the purpose of incriminating an
individual. Cf. United States ex rel. DeForte v. Mancusi, 379 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967);
Mansfield, supra note 4, at 105-11. However, because the indictments and investiga-
tions were rendered pursuant to the congressional power to regulate mail service, it
seems more likely that Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), would be controlling,
and the evidence would be admissible. See Meltzer, supra note 4, at 693-95; notes 47
& 49 infra and accompanying text. But see Note, 68 HAv. L. R.v. 340, 346 (1954).
30 221 U.S. at 380. The consent or waiver rationale has been severely attacked by
critics of the disclosure doctrine as begging the question of an individual's fifth amend-
ment privilege in a group context. See Meltzer, supra note 4, at 703-04; note 6 supra.
Mr. Justice McKenna, who dissented in Wilson, felt that the "waiver" rationale was
viable only where one undertook to become the custodian of governmental "public"
records. Only then, knowing that such records were open to general inspection, could
an individual be said to have "waived" the privilege. See 221 U.S. at 388-90 (McKenna,
J., dissenting); Note, 47 COLUM. L. Rv. 838 (1947); cf. Shapiro v. United States, 335
U.S. 1, 65-68 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice McKenna also noted
that property considerations had little to do with the assertion of a constitutional
privilege. 221 U.S. at 387-88. His views were confirmed with respect to the fourth
amendment in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265-67 (1960). See United States
ex rel. DeForte v. Mancusi, 379 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967). However, the "property"
theory of fifth amendment applicability, i.e., that the privilege may not be utilized
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While the concept of visitorial powers3 first developed with the
advent of official limitations on corporate activities,-8 it subsequently
became clear that disclosure was generally an exercise in the regula-
tion of commerce and not simply supervision of the corporate form. 0
In United States v. White,40 the Supreme Court recognized that
since entities such as unions, religious bodies, or social groups are
not subject to state approval for their existence, the "visitorial"
inspection theory was too narrow to sustain the compelled disclosure
of these organizations' records and the corresponding diminution of
their officers' privilege against self-incrimination. 41  Rather, em-
phasizing the "personal" nature of the privilege,42 the Court grounded
the constitutionality of such informational schemes upon the charac-
ter of the collectivized interests sought to be regulated. Thus, the
test for determining fifth amendment applicability to an organiza-
tion and its officers was
whether... under all the circumstances... a particular type of
organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its mem-
bership and activities that it cannot be said to embody the purely
to prevent the production of incriminatory records not belonging to the accused, has
never been overruled. See Meltzer, supra note 4, at 706-08; Note, The Constitutional
Rights of Associations to Assert the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 394, 896 (1964); cf. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 122-25 (1957); United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944). But cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 397,
350 n.5, 351-52 (1967).
87 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906). One commentator has noted that prior
to the Hale decision, the states had not assumed the visitorial powers assertedly theirs
and had allowed corporations to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. Note,
The Constitutional Rights of Associations to Assert the Privilege Against Self-Incrim-
ination, 112 U. PA. L. Rv. 394, 396-97 & nn.24-26 (1964); see note 82 supra.
2"See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906).
39 See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 72-75 (1906); ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 41-
45 (1904). Compare FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305 (1924), with
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 647-51 (1950).
0 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
41 Id. at 700-05.
4 Id. at 700-01. Emphasis upon the "personal" nature of the privilege allowed
the Court simply to parallel and enlarge the original explication of the rationale of
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). Thus, if the organization were not "personal"
in character neither the entity nor its officers could claim the privilege. Moreover, the
White Court retained the "visitorial" power concept in a modified form, stating that
"[b]asically, the power to compel the production of the records of any organization,
whether it be incorporated or not, arises out of the inherent and necessary power of
the federal and state governments to enforce their laws .... ." 322 U.S. at 700-01.
Nevertheless, the test of organizational fifth amendment applicability was set forth in
terms of the relationship between the group and individual-not the association and
the governmental need for information. Id. at 701.
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private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to em-
body their common or group interests only.4 3
Under this standard, neither a union, as an impersonal con-
glomeration of economic interests, nor its representatives could
claim the fifth amendment with respect to incriminatory union
records, for there was "no element of personal privacy" to which
the privilege could attach." Although no criteria or constitutional
bases for classifying an organization as "personal" or "impersonal"
were enunciated, the Court still had attempted to formulate a test
of fifth amendment applicability in terms other than the Govern-
ment's self-serving declaration of "overriding public interest."45
Nevertheless, the Court later obviated the basic premise of the
White standard by denying fifth amendment applicability to the
most "personal" of all regulatory economic disclosures.46 Reverting
to a strict "public necessity" rationale, the Court approved the com-
pelled disclosure of an individual businessman's incriminating rec-
ords which had been kept pursuant to law.47 Expeditiously ignor-
1 322 U.S. at 701.
"1Id. at 700-03. See notes 112-21 infra and accompanying text.
'r See note 42 supra. One commentator has suggested that the "public" interest in
organizational information bears an inverse relationship to the "personal" nature of
that organization. Thus, there may be little conflict between personal assertion of
the privilege and the governmental need for information. See Note, The Constitutional
Rights of Associations to Assert the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 394, 398-99, 407 (1964); cf. Douglas, supra note 25, at 1377-79. But cf. Mc-
Naughton, supra note 13, at 145-46 & n.37.
Meltzer has criticized the "personal-impersonal" test as vague in that the Court
failed to reveal what criteria should be utilized to determine if a group, and thus
its officers, meet the standard necessary for invocation of the fifth amendment privilege.
Meltzer, supra note 4, at 705. Furthermore, he has questioned whether the obvious
factors of size, numbers, or time given by individuals to group activities are proper
criteria for determination of a constitutional privilege since they provide no measure
of the public's interest in disclosure and show no clear relation to the purpose of the
privilege. Id. at 705-06; see Fraser, supra note 25, at 445. But see Note, The Constitu-
tional Rights of Associations to Assert the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 112
U. PA. L. Rxv. 394, 399 (1964) (vindicating the White test on the basis of additional
mechanical factors). For a discussion of Professor Meltzer's "balancing" solution see
note 82 infra.
40 But cf. United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 358 (1950) (supporting the White
test in dictum as applicable to officer of a political organization).
'1 Shapiro v. United States, 335 US. 1 (1948). The appellant, Shapiro, had been
convicted of violating the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
While the opinion suggests that the decision was based partially upon the powers of
Congress to enact programs in pursuit of the war power, 335 U.S. at 11-14, 32, the
case has not been distinguished by courts or commentators on that basis. See Mansfield,
supra note 4, at 148-50; Meltzer, supra note 4, at 710-15; Note, 65 COLUx. L. REv. 681,
685 (1965); Note, 68 HARv. L. Rzv. 340, 341-42 (1954). But see Note, The Constitutional
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ing White,48 the Court thus accepted the informational technique as
a method of criminal detection49 and acknowledged at least a limited
congressional power to withdraw the privilege from an individual
by enacting regulatory laws requiring records of a particular eco-
nomic form or activityY0
The Court, however, has indicated that at least one aspect of the
fifth amendment privilege remains available to the organizational
individual51 by ruling that a custodian of records could not be com-
Rights of Associations to Assert the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 394, 402 (1964). The position of the Shapiro majority in enunciating the
"required records" doctrine was that Congress might pass a law requiring records to be
kept for informative and incriminatory purposes. Such records, "required to be kept
by law," were then assimilated into the domain of public information and their produc-
tion might be compelled without violating the privilege against self-incrimination. 335
U.S. at 15-19. The irony of this position is manifest. If, as the majority also asserted,
oral testimony may not be compelled, the businessman who refuses ab initio to comply
with a disclosure law by not keeping records has a greater constitutional protection than
the "law-abiding" merchant who might unknowingly have violated the law, but
kept the required records. See MAGUIRE § 2.09, at 104 & n.24.
48For a discussion which accommodates the "personal-impersonal" test of the
White case to Shapiro on the ground that the latter reflects the exercise of Congress'
war power see Note, The Constitutional Rights of Associations to Assert the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 112 U. PA. L. Rav. 394, 398-402 (1964). The same com-
mentator would apply only the White test in determining fifth amendment applica-
bility. Id. at 402. Since Shapiro's apparent elimination of the White test, however,
lower courts have treated the latter decision in a rather cavalier manner to support
or deny the production of "personal" business records such as those of a partnership.
Compare United States v. Fulcher, 229 F. Supp. 456, 458 (D. Md. 1964), United States
v. Onassis, 133 F. Supp. 327, 331-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), and United States v. Silverstein,
314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963), with United States v. Cogan,
257 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
49 335 U.S. at 15. The foundation for acceptance of the informational technique
had been laid by early bankruptcy cases wherein the Court had refused to permit in-
culpatory private business records surrendered to the referee under the bankruptcy laws
to be protected by invocation of the fifth amendment. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Arndstein,
266 U.S. 34, 41 (1924); cf. Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 13-15 (1918).
"O 335 U.S. at 15; see 8 WiOZmoRE § 2259c, at 367 & n.15; Meltzer, supra note 4, at
712. The Court indicated that this congressional power to require records for the
enforcement of regulations was subject to due process limitations: "It may be assumed
at the outset that there are limits which the Government cannot constitutionally
exceed in requiring the keeping of records which may be inspected by an admin-
istrative agency and may be used in prosecuting statutory violations committed by
the record-keeper himself. But no serious misgiving that these bounds have been
overstepped would appear to be evoked when there is a sufficient relation between
the activity sought to be regulated and the public concern so that the Government can
constitutionally regulate or forbid the basic activity concerned, and can constitutionally
require the keeping of particular records, subject to inspection by the Administrator."
335 U.S. at 32. See note 82 infra. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632
(1950), however, indicated that administrative fishing expeditions and general sur-
veillance of organizational records were proper simply for purposes of general super-
vision. See id. at 652.
5 Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957). See generally Fraser, supra note
25; Meltzer, supra note 4.
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pelled to testify orally as to the contents or whereabouts of organiza-
tional records.52 The recent expansion of the privilege to include
not only oral statements but all "testimonially communicative acts"
argues for a reconsideration of compelled organizational disclosure
which is incriminatory to an individual member.53
THE "ORGANIZATION MAN" AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT
Review of regulatory schemes implemented by informational dis-
closing was also dictated by the Supreme Court's increased emphasis
on the right of anonymity54 inherent in the newly-emphasized first
amendment freedom of association. 55 Constitutional impediments
11 354 U.S. at 123-25. Earlier cases had asserted that officers retained an oral
privilege with respect to corporate records. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 27
(1948); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 385 (1911). But see United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 332 (1950) (dictum); Pulford v. United States, 155 F.2d 944, 947
(6th Cir. 1946) (officer may be required to authenticate records); United States v.
Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 863 (1929) (same).
See generally Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade
Commission (pts. 1-I1), 28 COLUM. L. REv. 708, 905 (1928). The Court's willingness to
grant an oral privilege to corporate officers may have been related to the then-
prevailing concept of the fifth amendment as an absolute prohibition against com-
pelled testimony "from the accused's own mouth." See, e.g., Shapiro v. United States,
supra at 27. However, the Court's precise decision was unclear. It may have been
that the privilege was granted because merely divulging the location of the records
would have involved the accused in a crime. On the other hand, the reasoning may
have been that no oral testimony could be compelled from an individual officer. See
354 U.S. at 125, 127 9- n.6. Compare United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., supra at
253-54, with Shapiro v. United States, supra at 27, and United States v. Daisart Sports-
wear, Inc., 169 F.2d 856, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1948), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949). In either event, however, the "oral"
exception remains anomalous to the extent that an officer may be required to write in
a report that which he cannot be forced to speak orally. See Note, 68 HARv. L. REv.
340, 341-42 (1954). Compare Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 294 (1967), and Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), with Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
A possible explanation of the oral privilege exception could be that if an accused were
compelled to testify orally, the prosecuting authorities would gain information "per-
sonal" to the accused and not "corporate" information. Cf. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 70 (1906) (dictum). However, this explanation fails to resolve the anomoly because
a corporate officer may reveal "personal" information in filling out a regulatory report.
5 Under the standard enunciated in Schmerber, the "testimonial act" protection
of the fifth amendment extends only to the individual asserting the privilege and not
to invocation of the privilege on behalf of another party. See Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 761 n.5 (1966); Note, 1967 Duan L.J. 366, 380 & n.90.
"See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60
(1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S 449 (1958); Douglas, supra note 25, at 1376-83; Emerson, Freedom of Associa-
tion and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.j. 1 (1964); Comment, The Constitutional
Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084, 1097-
1103 (1961).
r See Douglas, supra note 25; Emerson, supra note 54; Rice, supra note 25; Note, 46
VA. L. REv. 730 (1960).
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to requiring group disclosures having repressive effects on member-
ship were emphasized by attempts to regulate two such "first amend-
ment" organizations, the Communist Party and the NAACP. The
NAACP's refusal to produce its membership lists in contravention
of Alabama's right to control foreign corporations resulted in NAACP
v. Albama ex rel. Patterson.56 Recognizing the Association's privi-
lege to protect its adherents from public retribution which would
operate to discourage membership,57 the Court held that the govern-
mental interest served by the Alabama foreign corporation statute
was insufficient to justify the deterrent effects on the members' "right
to pursue their lawful private interests and to associate freely with
others .... ,,8
Conversely, in Communist Party of the United States v. SACB
(1961),59 the Court weighed the Party's associational rights against
congressional conclusions that the organization represented a threat
to national survival, finding in the latter a "state interest" sufficient
to debilitate the first amendment.60 However, as a result of the
Court's failure to pass upon the Party's fifth amendment claim,0 1
the latter refused to disclose the demanded information 2 within the
time prescribed by the Subversive Activities Control Act. Conse-
quently, responsibility for disclosure of Party affiliation devolved
upon the individual Party member. 3 Although both first and fifth
amendment challenges were made to this mandate, the Court, in
Albertson v. SACB,64 reached only the latter issue. 5  Acknowledging
" 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
'1 The Court spoke of the NAACP as the "proper representative of its membership."
Thus it seems that the first amendment was not being extended to the organization
but rather for the organization parens membership. See id. at 458-59.
" 357 U.S. at 466; see Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961);
cf. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
"367 U.S. 1 (1961).
oId. at 93-97.
61 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
62 Under § 27 (a) of the Subversive Activities Control Act, the Party was to register
and file the disclosure statement within 30 days after the order became final. 50 U.S.C.
§ 786 (a) (1964). See note 10 supra.
6" Subversive Activities Control Act § 8, 50 U.S.C. § 787 (1964). If the Party failed
to register as required, the individual members came under an obligation pursuant to
§ 8 of the Act to register themselves as members of that organization. If the members
did not voluntarily register, the Attorney General, under § 13 of the Act, 50 U.S.C.
§ 792 (a) (1964), was to petition the Board for a registration order directed toward those
individuals whom he had reason to believe were Party members.
" 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
O Id. at 73, 74 &c n.6.
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that self-incrimination was the inevitable result, the Court ruled
that a Party adherent might not be criminally punished for failure
to register information leading to his punishment under other statu-
tory schemes.60
COMMUNIST PARTY V. UNITED STATES (1967)
Arising after Albertson, the instant case was an appeal from the
Party's second conviction for failure to register and disclose its mem-
bership lists. 67 The issue presented on appeal was essentially
whether the Government could accomplish by means of associational
registration and disclosure that incrimination which Albertson made
unconstitutional to require of individual members.6 8 Although a
first amendment violation was argued,69 the circuit court considered
first amendment rights only within the content of a derogation of
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Distin-
guishing "first amendment" associations from those which might be
termed "economic action" organizations, the court indicated that
only the former were protected from incriminatory disclosures.70
"Economic action" groups were not entitled to the privilege because
"the public interest in the disclosure of the particular entity's affairs
is deemed to be paramount.... ."71
66Id. at 78. The Albertson Court also held that individual members' claims of
privilege were ripe for adjudication because their claim of privilege had been rejected
by the Justice Department, thereby placing the petitioners in the position of subjecting
themselves to incrimination or punishment for non-registration. Thus, unlike the
Party's claim in Communist Party of the United States v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1 (1961),
Albertson represented an example of immediate punishment without a hearing on the
merits of the claimant's fifth amendment invocation. See 382 U.S. at 74-77; note 13
supra and accompanying text.
07 See Communist Party of the United States v. United States, 384 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir.
1967).
08 Id. at 962. As characterized by the court, the issue was "whether, because of its
impact on the Party membership the weapon of compelled disclosure can, consistently
with the Fifth Amendment, be trained upon appellant." Id. at 960.
OD See Brief for Appellant at 31. The Party's first amendment argument was that
requiring registration as a "communist action" organization according to the Board's
determination violated the first amendment in demanding that the Party repeat "a
declaration which is contrary to appellants belief and is self-defamatory as well as pur-
poseless." Id. See generally Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act, and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. Cm. L. Rav. 687, 721-22 (1951). The court's
only allusion to this argument was that "so long as the self-incrimination clause of the
Fifth Amendment endures, activity may be made criminal, but the actor cannot be
compelled to characterize it as such and to disclose it." 384 F.2d at 962 (emphasis
added).
To See 384 F.2d at 963-64 n.9, 964-65.
71 Id. at 965.
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In resolving the inconsistencies between Albertson's mandate for
an individual privilege and precedent refusing the privilege to
organizations and their officers, the circuit court utilized a bifurcated
theoretical/practical approach.7 2  The theoretical determination of
fifth amendment applicability was based upon asserted distinctions
between "first amendment" and "economic action" organizations.7
The practical rationale, however, allowed the Party to invoke the
privilege because the legislative scheme could not possibly be effectu-
ated without violating the Albertson rule against individual dis-
closure and self-incrimination.7 4
Pursuing its theoretical justification, the majority attempted to
establish a privilege against self-incrimination on behalf of the Party
itself. Assuming that either outlawry or organizational disclosure
72 See id. at 964. Compare id. at 961-63, with id. at 966-67.
73 See id. at 962-64 nn. 7-9.
7' See id. at 965-67. The court noted that one of the grounds for the Albertson de-
cision was that there the "self-incrimination claims were 'not asserted in an essentially
noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry, but against an inquiry in an area permeated
with criminal statutes where response to any of the . . . questions in context might
involve the petitioners in the admission of a crucial element of a crime."' Id. at 960
(quoting from Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)). In the opinion of the
majority, this distinction placed appellant's fifth amendment claim in a far different
position from that of corporate officers who are required to fill out regulatory forms.
See 384 F.2d at 965. However, such an argument is too narrow, for it predicates fifth
amendment applicability only upon incrimination by revelation of status, rather than
the entire spectrum of "testimonial" activities which may be required of the individual
on behalf of the entity. See Note, The Constitutional Rights of Associations to Assert
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 394, 405-06. See also
Affeldt, Group Sanctions and Sections 8(b)(7) and 8(bX4): An Integrated Approach
to Labor Law, 54 GEo. L.J. 55, 65-73 (1965). But see Communist Party of the
United States v. SACB, 223 F.2d 531, 578-80 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (Bazelon, J., dissenting),
re-'d, 351 U.S. 115 (1956). Further, even if the Albertson rationale were valid within
the context of organizational disclosure, such reasoning would operate to create a
privilege for corporate officers also, for the "regulation" of economic groups is generally
achieved through criminal sanctions: "Perfectly lawful in itself and, indeed, permitted
only to exist by the favor of the law, a business corporation may in operation fall
afoul of a multitude of public purposes embodied in regulatory laws with criminal
sanctions." 384 F.2d at 963 n.9 (emphasis added). But see Morgan, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. RIv. 1, 37-38 (1949).
Finally, the court admits that resistance to organizational disclosure has resulted in
the punishment of individuals not the organization: "The doctrine that corporations
and associations have no privilege has largely been enunciated in cases where an indi.
vidual was sought to be criminally punished for refusing to produce records belonging
to the entity and kept in the course of its business." 384 F.2d at 962 (emphasis added).
See notes 120-21 infra and accompanying text. The above factors, ignored by the court,
simply point up the necessity for granting the privilege against self-incrimination to
officers of economic entities since they are compelled to testimonial acts which result in
self-incrimination, or alternatively punishment for contempt or perjury. See also
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
[Vol. 1968: 134
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
was proper as a discrete method of regulation, 75 the court held that a
conjunctive application was constitutionally invalid because criminal
sanctions had been attached to Party membership. 76 The unconsti-
tutionality of such an approach, however, was found to avail appellant
little if the Party remained unable to invoke an associational privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 77 Consequently, in order to establish
the economic first amendment organization distinction, it became
necessary for the majority to distinguish precedent denying the fifth
amendment to organizations and their officers. Borrowing the basic
rationale of that precedent, the court first asserted that the corporate
disclosure rule rested upon the public's interest in "continuing
access" to the records of regulated groups.78  Yet the majority failed
to state why this point was not equally applicable to the records of
"subversive" organizations, for the public interest in securing dis-
closure from "economic action" groups is no more compelling than
securing information from a group which threatens national survival.
Information necessary to survival would seem essential to the exis-
tence of an economy apart from its regulation. Moreover, unless
the commerce clause is a stronger basis for legislative action than
the "inherent" power of national survival, there is no constitutional
distinction which justifies incriminatory disclosure of economic
entities but not of subversive entities as well. Also, the public in-
terest concept rationalizes only the organizational disclosure, failing
to accommodate or explain the resultant incrimination of individuals
attached to the economic entity.79 Finally, utilizing the public in-
75 384 F.2d at 961-62. The court stated that the Party had itself been subjected "in
substance" to an outlawry which thereby vitiated the constitutionality of the disclosure
scheme. See id. at 960. However, the only statute which purports to outlaw the
Party, Communist Control Act of 1954, 50 U.S.C. §§ 841-44 (1964), has, as noted by the
circuit court, been read to treat the Party only as a "currently erring" political organiza-
tion, not one devoid of all constitutional rights. See 384 F.2d at 965-66 n.11. Further,
that act may be read as imposing no penalties whatsoever on the Party itself. See note
105 infra. But see Communist Party of the United States v. United States, 331 F.2d
807, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("The legislative array facing the Party virtually makes it a
criminal conspiracy per se.").
70 384 F.2d at 960, 961-62. The circuit court in the instant case affirmed the holding
of Communist Party of the United States v. United States, 331 F.2d 807, 813 n.10 (1963),
that the immunity provisions for those registering the Party were inadequate because
they prevented only the fact of registration from being introduced in a subsequent trial
-not information garnered from the registration disclosures. See Communist Party of
the United States v. SACB, 223 F.2d 531, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (Bazelon, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 351 U.S. 115 (1956); Meltzer, supra note 69, at 724.
77 384 F.2d at 962.
78 Id. at 962-63 9- n.7; see id. at 964-65.
79 In utilizing the "public interest" concept, neither commentators nor courts have
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terest to support economic organizational disclosures provides no
constitutional support for permitting revelations of criminal viola-
tions in the economic area while disapproving those in the security
sphere.
Although failing to resolve these inadequacies of the "public
interest" rationale, the circuit court did note that justifying com-
pelled disclosure by economic organizations by "expediency" doc-
trines begged the "essential question" of the constitutionality of con-
comitant restraints upon an individual's privilege against self-in-
crimination. 0 Nevertheless, the only solution advanced was that
an ad hoc balancing test of governmental versus associational or indi-
vidual interests should be utilized to determine fifth amendment
applicability in economic disclosure cases.8' The court, however,
proffered neither relevant criteria nor a constitutional basis by
which these interests might be distinguished from or paralleled to
those unarticulated interests mandating self-incriminatory protection
for individuals affected by the disclosure of first amendment organi-
zations. Moreover, the balancing approach leaves the "economic
action" individual in legalized limbo: if he invokes the privilege and
is not within its protection, he may suffer a contempt conviction or
criminal punishment; if he discloses and is convicted, he may learn
that the evidence need never have been revealed.8 2
yet explained why there is a greater public interest in requiring reports revealing
economic violations than in requiring all murderers or thieves to register their
activities with an agency for the regulation of crime. But see Mansfield, The Albertson
Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Government's
Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 103, 146-64. "Public interest" in the control
of syndicated crime is certainly as great as punishing a giant corporation for violations
of the antitrust laws. The only explanation seems to lie in expediency; i.e., the im-
possibility of an "underground" public corporation renders it more vulnerable to
governmental control.
0 384 F.2d at 963 n.8, quoting Meltzer, supra note 69, at 701-06; see Mansfield, supra
note 79. The lack of constitutional rationale was noted by dissenters to the organiza-
tional disclosure doctrine as early as Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 88 (1906) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting), and Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 590-91 (1911) (McKenna, J., dis-
senting). Cf. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 51 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).81 See 384 F.2d at 963 n.8.
82For a discussion of federal immunity statutes which mitigate the difficulties of
determining the occasion for proper invocation of the fifth amendment see Comment,
The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading ,the Constitu-
tional Tightrope, 72 YALE LJ. 1568 (1963). The difficult task of knowing when to assert
the privilege without incurring a contempt sentence is not resolved by the solutions
offered by several commentators. For example, Meltzer has suggested that fifth amend-
ment applicability should be determined by weighing the governmental need for
information, violations of individual privacy, and the existence of a purpose other
than the detection of criminal violations. Meltzer, supra note 69, at 715. Mansfield
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Despite an attempt to avoid "begging" the same question of fifth
amendment limitations with respect to "first amendment groups,"
the court nevertheless did no more than imply that such a connota-
tion ipso facto created a constitutional enclave within the compelled
disclosure doctrine.as The majority grounded withholding the privi-
lege from economic groups upon the conclusion that "[o]ne who in-
vests in a corporation or joins a labor union commits himself to the
collective pursuit of economic ends. . . ." for which the unit exists.8 4
The validity of determining individual self-incriminatory protection
according to a classification of strictly group purposes may be readily
questioned. It is apparent, for example, that many first amendment
groups, such as the NAACP, may have economic as well as social
objectives"5 and that the organizational unit is the vehicle intended
would agree with this basic approach, but would place additional factors on the bal-
ancing scale, including the importance of the governmental objective; the requirement
that disclosure be utilized to accomplish this end; whether disclosure is "conditioned
upon engaging in an activity deemed basic to freedom; and whether the disclosed in-
formation would be utilized in a criminal proceeding." Mansfield, supra note 79, at
160. But see 8 WIGMORE § 2259c, at 366-67 (indicating that such factors are relevant
only to due process limitations on the scope of regulation, not fifth amendment applica-
bility). Although the "balancing" solutions have appeal, they fail adequately to
account for those situations where the individual is the "confessing instrument" of his
own conviction in the reporting or production of associational information. See Note,
The Constitutional Rights of Associations to Assert the Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 394, 406 (1964). See notes 112-17 infra and accompanying
text.
McNaughton would require only that the Government show prior knowledge that
such incriminatory information existed before allowing the abolition of a claim of
privilege. See McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 51 J. CRIM. L.C.
& P.S. 138, 145-46 & n.37, 153-54 (1960). Yet another commentator has suggested that
the privilege is applicable only in terms of "freedom from compelled disclosure of
private information." Note, 65 CoLum. L. Rv. 681, 693-94 (1965). Thus, the "com-
pulsion" aspect of self-incrimination would become relevant only if records were
required to be kept which would not "ordinarily come into existence." Id. at 693.
Concomitantly, personal privacy would be invaded only in the same circumstances, for
those records which are ordinarily kept would not be a reflection of matters normally
considered personal or private by the associational individual. Id. at 693-95. This
solution, however, seems particularly vulnerable to criticism for it results in unequal
protection against self-incrimination for individuals depending upon habits and willing-
ness to flout the law. For example, if the defendant normally recorded all of his
activities in the ordinary course of business, he would lose the privilege; yet the
businessman who did not record any information, or only the most basic material,
would be protected from such disclosure and might equally escape punishment for
failure to report at all.
8- See 384 F.2d at 964-65. See note 107 infra and accompanying text.
84 384 F.2d at 963 n.9. See generally Affeldt, supra note 74.
sr For a general discussion of the drive for Negro advancement in economic areas see
Batchelder, Economic Forces Serving the Ends of Negro Protest, 357 ANNALS OF THE
A%sR. ACAD. OF POLIT. AND Soc. Sci. 80 (1965), and Morsell, The National Association
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to accomplish these purposes. Yet it seems clear from the court's
approach that fifth amendment protections would be granted to
individuals within such a group. The "group purpose" concept,
in failing to consider whether the individual's relationship to the
group is inculpatory, does not seem to be a valid criterion for dis-
tinguishing fifth amendment applicability.80
The circuit court, however, advanced a second distinguishing
factor, positing that the first amendment encompasses the personal
right to associate with those of similar beliefs "whereas the right
to form a corporation or labor union is nowhere guaranteed in terms
by the constitution."87 Failing to mention that the right to join a
union has been held to be constitutionally based, 8 the majority also
did not explain why a positive grant of first amendment rights was
correlative to a right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Thus, while it is clear that the right to promote one's interest
through a particular economic form is not expressly guaranteed by
the Constitution,8 9 it seems equally apparent that an absolute pro-
hibition of association for the accomplishment of permissible eco-
nomic ends would not comport with constitutional considerations. 0
for the Advancement of Colored People and Its Strategy, 357 ANNALS OF THE AMER.
AcAD. OF PorUT. AND Soc. Sc. 97 (1965).
"8But cf. McNaughton, supra note 82, at 145-46 & n.37 (implying that the "first
amendment" appellation may be sufficient to allow invocation of the privilege against
self-incrimination by group or associated individuals).
87 384 F.2d at 964 n.9.
88 See Rice, The Constitutional Right of Association, 16 HAxnNcs L.J. 491, 493-99
(1965); note 90 infra. See generally Affeldt, supra note 74.
so Various first amendment cases involving individual rights within an employment-
disclosure context have seemingly been partially predicated upon a privilege to work
without giving up the protection of the fifth amendment. See Slochower v. Board, 350
U.S. 551 (1956). Compare Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), with Talley
v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). See also
the dissenting opinions in Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 82 (1959), and Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959).
"o There are negative implications of a constitutional "right to work." For example,
in McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892), Mr.
Justice Holmes stated that "there are few employments ... in which the servant does
not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free speech, as well as of idleness, by
the implied terms of his contract."
The primary support for an argument that the economic role is constitutionally
protected, however, is derived from dicta in the Supreme Court decisions upholding the
"right to work" laws of various states. See AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335
U.S. 538, 540 (1949); Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
335 U.S. 525, 530-31, 534-37 (1949). The right to join a labor union, an economic
activity organization, is also considered to have constitutional stature. See Lincoln
Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., supra; Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,
323 U.S. 248 (1942). Moreover, as it has been held that there is a constitutional right
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The court's approach implies that the economic role of the individual
in a group status is somehow less worthy of fifth amendment safe-
guards than spiritual or political roles.91 Although emphasizing the
personal implications of a first amendment role, such as the promul-
gation of political or religious beliefs,92 the majority failed to distill
these characteristics into a constitutional basis distinguishing invoca-
tion of the fifth amendment only by first amendment groups or
officers. Thus, the court necessarily conceded that the "personal-
impersonal" test enunciated in White93 was not helpful in deter-
mining applicability of the fifth amendment in a concrete case.94
Admitting that its theoretical "personal" first amendment ap-
proach had proved too "elusive," 95 the majority ultimately deter-
mined the privilege to be available by a practical approach based
upon the observation that all associational entities acted only through
"human instrumentalities."'96 Although largely disregarding the
to engage in interstate commerce, a necessary inference is that individuals must be
able to work in interstate commerce. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500
(1967), citing Western Union v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910). But see United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1951) ("The Federal Government allows [corpo-
rations] the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.') (emphasis added). Recently,
in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), the Supreme Court ruled unconstitu-
tional § 5 (a) (1) (D) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C.
§ 784 (a) (1) (D) (1964). In the opinion of the Court, it was a violation of the first
amendment freedom of association to outlaw employment in a defense facility on
the basis of "mere" membership in the Communist Party. Moreover, the Court
approved the language of Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959), that "the right
to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from un-
reasonable governmental interference comes within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts
of the fifth amendment." 389 U.S. at 265 & n.ll.
01 Compare Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335
U.S. 525 (1949), with NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and
Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961). See also Spevack v.
Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
02 84 F.2d at 963-64 n.9.
0 822 U.S. 694 (1944). See notes 40-45 supra and accompanying text.
0384 F.2d at 964-65.
01 Id. at 964. One commentator who applied the White test to the issue of Com-
munist Party disclosure concluded that a world-wide conspiracy was so "impersonal" as
to mandidate debilitation of fifth amendment protections. See Note, The Constitutional
Rights of Associations to Assert the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 112 U. PA.
L. R v. 894, 414-16 (1964).
00 384 F.2d at 965. In introducing the practical phase of the opinion, the court seem-
ingly implied that at least some business corporations and unions might also claim the
privilege: "Short of trying in the abstract, to sort out associations for whom the
privilege has meaning from those for whom it does not, it is useful to recall the
reality which underlies them all. Although the law has made room for the concept
of an artificial entity which, for some purposes at least, has a life separate and distinct
from the individuals who comprise it, it remains the fact that no such entity can act
other than through human instrumentalities." Id. at 964-65. However, the unprotected
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plight of the incriminated individual in an economic context,97 the
court did recognize the self-inculpatory results of a disclosure scheme
directed toward a first amendment group.98 The majority noted
that under Albertson the privilege against self-incrimination shielded
an individual from the compulsory inculpatory disclosure of Party
affiliation. 9 Because that organization's required records could be
obtained only from such protected members, the order commanding
the Party to disclose could not be implemented.10 0 Therefore, the
regulations allowing disclosure of the requested information through
an "agent" or "other person" provided no protection against self-
incrimination since that individual could be required to disclose and
thus incriminate his source. Consequently, the court concluded
that where criminal sanctions are attached to participation in a first
amendment organization, the fifth amendment prevents compulsory
disclosures by either the organization or its members. 101
Despite this dualized theoretical/practical approach to fifth
amendment applicability, the court failed to present a coherent
rationale accounting for the differing constitutional implications
of economic and first amendment group disclosures with respect to
the incriminated individual. Moreover, to the extent that the first
amendment group exception does have a constitutional validity, the
distinction was never related to the "personal-impersonal" standard
of privilege enunciated in White. 0 2
status of the economic entity, and thus its officers, was cursorily dismissed on the basis
of the "public interest" concept. Id. at 965.
07 See id. at 965, 967.
98 1d. at 965, 968. See notes 78-82 supra and accompanying text.
99 Id. at 965.
1 0 Id. at 967. The circuit court phrased the "impossibility" of carrying out group
disclosure through protected members in the following terms: "To the lay observer
equipped only with a sure sense of logic and unconfused by the legal lore of the
assertedly personal nature of the privilege this might suggest that the Act, like King
Canute, vainly commands the impossible; and that the legislative scheme has a flavor
of irrationality in a due process sense. But this condition of ineffectiveness to cn-
compass the criminal punishment of appellant for something it lacks the means to
accomplish derives in the last analysis from the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination." Id. at 965. For a discussion of the "impossibility" argument in
terms of unconstitutional conditions see generally Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions
and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. Rxv. 321 (1935); Merrill, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 879 (1929); and Note, 38 IND. L.J. 520 (1953).
101 See 384 F.2d at 967. The court implied, at various times, that the "theoretical"
and "practical" approaches were equivalents; that if an individual had a fifth amend-
ment privilege with respect to a first amendment group, the organization also had a
privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at 965, 967.




Utilization of a first amendment test of fifth amendment applica-
bility required a delineation of both the scope of the privilege and the
precise posture in which the fifth amendment was asserted by the
Party. The privilege is personal in nature, protecting against "testi-
monial compulsion" which results in self-incrimination of the person
asserting the fifth amendment. 10 3 As invoked by the Party, how-
ever, the privilege was meant to protect the membership against
the inculpatory results of compelled organizational disclosure.
0 4
The only punishment attaching to the Party as an entity resulted
from nondisclosure-not disclosure. 10 5 Thus, in asserting the privi-
lege, the Party's position paralleled that of the association in NAA CP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson:0 6 the entity desired to raise a constitu-
tional right of its members in order that the organization itself might
escape punishment for nondisclosure. Clearly, the Party's claim
was vicarious, derived from the privilege of its adherents. Therefore,
the circuit court's statement that the privilege stands between the
Party and the punishment sought to be imposed upon it for non-
disclosure pertains only to the relation between the incriminatory
effect of the Party's disclosure upon its members and the fifth amend-
10 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966); Note, Supreme Court
Delineates the Relationship Between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 1967 DuKE
L.J. 366, 380-81 & n.90.
0,' See Brief for Appellant at 17-25, Communist Party of the United States v. United
States, 384 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
"Or Congress, in passing the Communist Control Act of 1954, 50 U.S.C. §§ 841-44
(1964), provided that "the Communist Party should be outlawed." Id. § 841. How-
ever, § 2 of that Act provided for no penalties against the Party, except that it should
not be "entitled to any of the rights, privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal
bodies created under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States or any political
subdivision thereof; and whatever rights, privileges and immunities have been granted
... are terminated ...... 50 U.S.C. § 842 (emphasis added). Arguably, the Act
could be interpreted to mean that because the Party was not incorporated and therefore
had not been created by the United States or any individual state, the 1954 Act de-
prived it of no rights and disclosure would have subjected it to no penalties or punish-
ments. See note 75 supra.
The scope of the application of the Act seems to have been tested only once in
the courts. In Communist Party of the United States v. Catherwood, 367 U.S. 389
(1961), the Supreme Court held that New York could not exclude the Party from that
State's unemployment compensation system with the result that the petitioner would
have to pay a higher federal tax rate, simply on the basis of the declaration in § 2 of
the Act that the Party should be deprived of the rights, privileges and immunities
granted by a political subdivision of the United States. 867 U.S. at 394, 395. The only
other court which concerned itself with the meaning of the Act was hesitant in de-
scribing the scope of the provisions as taking away rights which Congress might
constitutionally take away. See United States v. Silverman, 132 F. Supp. 820, 828-29
(D. Conn. 1955), reu'd, 248 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 942 (1958).
100 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
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ment privilege held by them. The implication that a first amend-
ment organization itself has a privilege whenever the punishment
would be effectuated against the organization for a crime not in-
culpatory to its adherents is dictum.107
Alabama ex rel. Patterson'05 had made clear that an associational
entity could assert its adherents' first amendment rights. By exer-
cising their freedom of association, NAACP members had taken on
the attributes of the organization-which thus became but a mag-
nification of each individual member's beliefs. 109 The group, then,
was entitled to assert the first amendment rights of the membership
because of the close "nexus" between the organization and mem-
bers.110 On the other hand, in the instant case a first amendment
group was asserting a constitutional right of its members other than
the first amendment. Arguably, such vicarious protection is per-
missible whenever legislation or administrative action directed at the
organization has the effect of diluting an individual's right to associ-
ational anonymity or the privilege against self-incrimination because
the individual himself cannot assert the theory of such rights in a
legal proceeding without, in reality, losing their protection." 1 Thus,
an individual who joins a first amendment group thereby "testifies"
as to the beliefs promulgated by that organization."12 If association
0 7 The court's strongest intimation of an organizational privilege per se was
framed as an alternative statement of the practical and theoretical rationales: "The
result is surely the same whether it be stated in terms of the availability of the privi-
lege to appellant, because of its distinctive nature or whether it be said that it is a
violation of the privilege concededly available to the individuals associated with
appellant ... ." 384 F.2d at 965; see id. at n.4; notes 100, 101 supra. United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), had also implied that a privilege might exist on behalf
of the organization itself. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. But see notes
103-06 supra and accompanying text.
108 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
100 While individual variations on the organizational theme must be recognized,
nevertheless, with a voluntary organization, the individual may, and presumably will,
leave the fold when the disparity between his belief and the group belief becomes
too great. Mr. Justice Frankfurter early recognized the intimate relationship even
between involuntary associations and their members: "A union is no more than a
medium through which individuals are able to act together; union power was begotten
of individual helplessness. But that power can come into being only when, and con-
tinues to exist only so long as, individual aims are seen to be shared in common
with the other members of the group." AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S.
538, 545 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See generally Affeldt, supra note 74.
o10 357 US. at 459.
"I1 See id.
112 Compare Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), with AFL v. American
Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 545 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
[Vol. 1968: 134
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
for the purpose of effectuating that belief is outlawed, the taint of
criminality reaches the individual in his group status. Accordingly,
the fifth amendment should protect against the associational inculpa-
tion of the earlier "testimonial" step taken by the individual in
becoming a member.
It might be urged, however, that the fifth amendment prohibits
only testimonial compulsion against the individual asserting the
privilege and that the compulsion in the instant case was directed
toward the organization rather than the members since the punish-
ment for nondisclosure was a fine against the Party.113 However,
Congress had determined that the Communist Party was dedicated
to the violent overthrow of the Government and had made criminal
individual membership in order to prevent effectuation of the Party's
goals." 4 Thus to be a member was, in terms of the Smith Act, to be
one with the Party." 5 Consequently, compulsion directed toward
the association was compulsion against the individuals comprising
that group. The Party, then, as a first amendment organization,
should be entitled to assert the privilege against self-incrimination
because the relationship between individual and group is such that
the entity has no "life separate" from those who comprise jt. n6
If this group-individual congruity is accepted as the basis of the
court's first amendment distinction, then the "personal-impersonal"
test for fifth amendment applicability also becomes meaningful
within the constitutional framework. As the individual becomes less
"testimonially" involved with an entity,"l7 his relationship to the
organization is less "personal" in scope and the interaction of the
two is molded less by group desire than individual necessity. Corre-
latively, the "testimony" of the entity becomes a feature separate from
I13 Such an argument would be based upon the theory that compulsion against A to
produce property incriminatory to B is not compulsion against B. See note 6 supra.
"' See note 74 supra.
115 Compare Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1965), with Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203 (1961).
116 384 F.2d at 964-65. See notes 15, 112 supra and accompanying text.
1 7To the degree that an association represents a belief or emotional stance of an
individual, the latter may be said to be "testimonially" involved or identified with the
organization itself. See note 112 supra and accompanying text. However, as the
associational purpose loses its characteristics as the fulfillment of personal beliefs and
becomes a vehicle for remunerative gratification only, group and individual are no
longer testimonially identical because the organization itself exists on a functional,
not a personal, level. See note 109 supra.
Vol. 1968: 134]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
the "testimony" of its members.118 The individual, therefore, has
no constitutionally recognized interest in having the organization
invoke the "personal" privilege on his behalf."0 Yet the "com-
pulsion" exerted against the organization may be effectuated in such
a manner that the activities of the individuals through whom it
must act become personally testimonial, 20 as where an individual
officer is forced to respond to a subpoena duces tecum of business
or corporate records or to sign informational reports of incrimina-
tory material.' 2 ' If the state may ignore individual incrimination
because the records "belong" to the entity, or are "necessary" to its
regulation, then administrative control of the organization becomes
a conduit for the exercise of state compulsion against the indi-
vidual. 22 The economic organization's lack of privilege, there-
118 See AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 545 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
:110 Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966).
120 Mansfield has suggested that a violation of the fifth amendment occurs if a report-
ing scheme is directed solely at the individual and entirely or predominately for the
purpose of incrimination. See Mansfield, supra note 79, at 139-60. Meltzer, however,
has stated that there is no historical justification for allowing invocation of the privilege
simply because an allegedly general investigation is focused upon a particular indi-
vidual. See Meltzer, supra note 69, at 694. In his opinion, the due process clause
would be sufficient protection against reporting schemes aimed solely at criminal con-
viction. See id. at 727-28.
121The permissible extent of compulsion against a group which necessitates in-
criminatory action in the mode of disclosure might well be determined by the extent
to which the Government may act directly against the individual in disclosure or
reporting situations. For example, from the dicta in United States v. Sullivan, 274
U.S. 259, 263 (1927), it would seem that an individual may be required to report in-
come but claim the privilege against revealing its source if such information would
lead to criminal conviction. Similarly, an individual could not be ordered, pursuant
to compulsion against the organization, to disclose or register that which is criminally
related to him personally. See Note, The Constitutional Rights of Associations to Assert
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 112 U. PA. L. Rav. 394, 405-06 (1964); cf.
Marchetti v. United States, 36 U.S.L.W. 4143 (U.S. Jan. 29, 1968) (No. 2), overruling
United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), and Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419
(1955) (registration and payment of gambling tax unconstitutional). See also United
States ex rel. DeForte v. Mancusi, 379 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967).
For discussion of the extent to which reporting statutes have been used against
individuals see generally Mansfield supra note 79, and Note, Quasi Public Records and
Self-Incrimination, 47 CoLUr.. L. Rnv. 838 (1947).
122 The Supreme Court has asserted that due process limitations exist with respect
to the extent which the Government may utilize regulations for the purpose of securing
information of criminal violations. See note 50 supra. Such statements, however,
have not seemingly presented any effectual limitations on the omniscient exercise of
governmental regulatory and disclosure powers. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-54 (1950). However, both Meltzer and Mansfield would utilize
legislative purpose as a principal criterion for a balancing test to determine fifth
amendment applicability. See note 82 supra. If it is conceded that the privilege is
personal and therefore inapplicable to organizations, then a balancing test comprised
of such due process considerations would seem appropriately applied to determine the
[Vol. 1968:134
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
fore, should be regarded simply as a neutral factor rather than a
bridge by which the state may negate individual rights. Further,
granting the full privilege to the individual associated with the
economic entity is consistent with the "oral" testimony exception.
123
Requiring an officer to produce in record form that information
which he cannot be forced to produce orally seems to contravene
rational constitutional doctrine.124 Thus, where an individual may
become the confessing instrument of evidence which leads to his
prosecution, the privilege against self-incrimination should bar com-
pulsion to that end.1 25
constitutionality of requiring disclosure of the entity. However, this approach is not
a viable protection for individuals who, in becoming involved with economic entities,
do not agree to give up their privilege against self-incrimination for a "balanced"
protection against the compulsory powers of the Government. See notes 6, 36 supra
and accompanying text.
123 Curco v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957). See notes 51-53 supra and accom-
panying text.
121 See Mansfield, sura note 79, at 136-38; Note, 68 HARv. L. REv. 340, 341-42 (1954).
But see note 52 supra.
225 If the full scope of the fifth amendment is held applicable to the "economic"
individual, however, an answer must be given to the argument that effective govern-
mental regulation of the economic entity is thereby rendered impossible. See generally
Mansfield, supra note 79; Meltzer, supra note 69.
Where the Government seeks to control the operations of a one-man business, the
relevant law might require the keeping of records but allow the businessman simply
to claim the privilege with respect to items incriminatory to him personally. Placing
the individual in a position where he may need to claim the privilege is not itself
violative of the fifth amendment, and the Government would be advised of question-
able activity. But see McNaughton, supra note 82, at 153-54; Communist Party of the
United States v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 191 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting); note 13 supra.
Proof of violation, however, would result from governmental investigation-not indi-
vidual self-incrimination. See generally Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Moreover, in dealing with economic entities
which are dependent upon public buying power, the Government might consider the
utilization of disclosure in the manner of cease and desist orders isssued under the
NLRB.
In determining effective means of controlling larger entities, while retaining the
utility of disclosure, Congress and the administrative agencies might adopt the approach
of the treble damages provisions of the Clayton Act. Increased punishment on the
organization level would mitigate the necessity for rendering individual activity criminal,
for the officer whose activities brought such sanctions upon the entity would no doubt
find himself with a limited economic future. However, the most practical method of
avoiding conflict between the privilege against self-incrimination and regulatory dis-
closure on the organizational level would be to require information to be disclosed
through a non-incriminated agent who would not be permitted to disclose the name of
those revealing the information to him. Moreover, members of the group would retain
the privilege as a bulwark against signing incriminatory reports or producing such in re-
sponse to a subpoena. See Note, The Constitutional Rights of Associations to Assert
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 112 U. PA. L. Rv. 394, 405-06 (1964). Such
methods would enable the Government to regulate economic activity, and retain com-
pulsory disclosure-but without the self-incrimination of individuals affiliated with the
group.
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